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Singleton v. Wulff:

EXTENSION OF THE RIGHT OF

PRIVACY THROUGH STANDING
INTRODUCTION

Missouri participates in the Medicaid program, under which
the Federal government partially underwrites qualifying state
plans for medical assistance to the needy.' Missouri's plan 2 includes a list of twelve categories of medical services that are eligible for Medicaid funding. The last category provides medical
assistance payments for pregnancies carried to term or for therapeutic abortions, but denies such payments for nontherapeutic
abortions.'
In 1974 two Missouri-licensed doctors brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the state Medicaid Statute.4 The
district court dismissed for lack of standing to bring the action.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Wulff v.
Singleton,5 held that the physicians did have standing to bring
the action. In reaching a similar decision on the subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Blackmun held that the
plaintiffs-physicians had standing to assert their own rights since
they suffered concrete injury of an economic and professional
nature from the operation of the challenged statute.7 The Court
also held' that physicians should be allowed to assert the rights
of their women patients to be free of the unconstitutional governmental interference with the decision to terminate pregnancy.'
This comment will examine the Court's rationale for granting the
physicians standing on each basis.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396(a)-1396(g) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 208.151-208.158 (Supp. 1975).
Mo. REV. STAT. § 208.151(12) (Supp. 1975) ("Family planning services as defined
by federal rules and regulations; provided, however, that such family planning services
shall not include abortion unless such abortions are medically indicated." Id.).
I Wulff v. State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts, 380 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Mo.
1974).
5 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 1041 (1975).
6 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
Id. at 112-13.
Id. at 118.
Justice Stevens, concurring, agreed with the Court's conclusion but, since he was
not sure that the plurality's analysis would sustain the physicians' standing to represent
their patients, he did not join in that part of the opinion. Id. at 121-22. Justice Powell,
joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Stewart, dissented as to the
issue of representation. Id. at 122.
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STANDING OF PHYSICIANS TO ASSERT THEIR OWN RIGHTS

A. Analysis of Wulff
The concept that a physician must show direct personal injury to be granted standing was first considered in the context of
abortion cases in Roe v. Wade 10 and Doe v. Bolton." The principal question in these cases was whether a state could constitutionally prohibit an abortion except when it was necessary to
protect the life of the mother.12 In each case, the Court granted
the physician standing to challenge a criminal abortion statute.
The Court reasoned that a sufficiently direct threat of personal
detriment existed because the physicians were the ones against
whom such statutes were aimed.13
In Griswold v. Connecticut,14 as in Roe and Doe, a physician,
who was criminally charged as an accessory to the crime of using
birth control devices and thus had a direct personal stake in the
result of the litigation, had standing to challenge the statute on
his own behalf.
These cases, relied upon by the Court, are best interpreted
as supporting only the limited proposition that the existence of a
criminal statute which directly affects the interests of a physician
will suffice to grant the physicians standing to challenge that
statute. Wulff can be distinguished from each of these cases. The
Missouri Medicaid statute imposes no criminal penalties upon
the physicians and in this respect does not serve to directly and
adversely affect their interests. The physicians are free to perform
abortions without fear of any possible prosecution.
30

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

" 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
" The Court's reason for recognizing the constitutional right to have an abortion was
that this decision lay within the right of privacy previously identified by the Court. See
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 209-15 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973). The
leading modem case establishing a constitutional right of privacy is Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which the Supreme Court held invalid a state law prohibiting
the use of contraceptive devices as applied to people who operated a birth control clinic.
The Court rested its decision on the conclusion that a number of specific guarantees of
the Bill of Rights protected "peripheral" rights or "penumbral" zones, some of which
came together to form a constitutionally protected zone of privacy. The marriage relationship lay within this zone of privacy and it would be a violation of this interstitial right to
permit governmental intrusion to enforce the anti-contraceptive law. Id. at 483-86.
3 410 U.S. at 124; 410 U.S. at 188.
" 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Another case the Court regarded as lending support to its
grant of standing to the physicians concerns a municipal hospital
resolution which prohibited use of hospital facilities for nontherapeutic abortions. In Nyberg v. City of Virginia,5 the District
Court granted the physicians standing on two grounds: First, they
have a right to practice medicine according to the highest medical
standards without unreasonable restraints; second, they cannot
be arbitrarily deprived of an opportunity to perform abortions
which may account for a portion of their livelihood."6
Although, as in Wulff, the Nyberg Court found that potential
economic injury was sufficient to grant standing, the physician's
ability to perform abortions in Nyberg was severely limited due
to the resolution adopted. The Medicaid statute under attack in
Wulff neither prohibits nor limits the physicians in the performing of abortions. Therefore, Wulff is again distinguishable.
This analysis indicates that a grant of standing to the physicians in Wulff based on their own direct injury is questionable. 7
Since only the welfare recipients are directly affected under the
Medicaid statute, they are the only proper parties to seek relief.
B.

Analysis of the Leading Cases

Although the Court can be criticized for its analysis in Wulff,
the court's inconsistency in this case brings into focus a more
significant problem with the Court's general methodology. Wulff
is an example of the Court's unwillingness to set out the various
considerations that arise when plaintiffs seek standing to complain of injuries caused by remote governmental action. The
Court tends to focus its decision around a narrow range of factors
that are more easily susceptible to classification and rulemaking
than are the policy concerns and values implicit in standing decisions. An attempt is made to root out the actual considerations
of the Court in the recent cases utilized by the Wulff Court. Wulff
is compared with these leading cases and reappraised in terms of
the factors the Court weighed in reaching its determination to
grant standing. This analysis will provide a reasonable basis for
predicting future standing cases.
IS

495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 891 (1974).

' Id. at 1344.
'7 See Note, Denial of Equal Protection to Patient as also Constituting Denial of
Equal Protection to Physician, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 213 (1975).
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In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 1 8 an unwed mother sought to
enjoin the discriminatory application of a Texas criminal child
support statute to parents of legitimate children only, claiming
that the district attorney unconstitutionally discriminated
against her illegitimate children by refusing to prosecute their
father for failure to provide child support." The Court determined that it was speculative whether the injury would be remedied even if the relief was granted because the only result of
success on the merits would be to send the father to jail. 0
Mr. Justice White criticized the majority's reasoning, arguing that criminal sanctions are useful in coercing fathers to meet
their support obligations.2 ' What is important to notice is that the
dissent's position, though resulting in an opposite conclusion
from the majority, is just as valid. Presumably, other factors
persuaded the Court to deny standing.
The controlling reason for denying standing was implied
when the Court pointed out that a person lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when that person is
neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.22 The underlying policy decision is that an interested and indirectly injured
party should not be permitted to interfere in prosecutorial decisions. By explicitly basing its decision to refuse standing on the
plaintiffs actual prospects for relief, the Court needlessly introduced a new concept into the law of standing.?
In United States v. SCRAP, 24 five law students challenged a
ruling of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) which allowed a surcharge on railroad rates, pending the adoption of rate
increases, until an environmental impact study was made under
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 25 Plaintiffs
Is410 U.S.

614 (1973).
Id. at 614-15.
SId.
Id. at 621.
Id. at 619.
23 The Court, in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), cited Linda R.S. v. Richard
D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), as support for its new causation test. The ultimate question in
Warth was not whether the defendant harmed plaintiffs in a specific way, but whether
the Court felt that it should provide effective relief. 422 U.S. at 504. The Court's reliance
on Linda R.S. illustrated this concern.
24412 U.S. 669 (1973).
1 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4342(2)(c) (1970).
"
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sought standing under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act" claiming that the surcharge would result in discrimination
against the hauling of recyclable goods and thereby damage the
environment." The Court granted standing by applying the liberal test that a complaint should be considered unless it appears
beyond a doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. The result
in SCRAP seems sensible only because the speculative injury was
of the type contemplated by the statute alleged to be violated.
NEPA required an environmental impact statement thereby indicating that the purpose of the legislation was to protect against
possible harm to the environment. Therefore, if the Court had
denied standing on the grounds that the plaintiffs' only harm was
concern over the possible detrimental environmental effects, it
necessarily would have defeated the purpose of NEPA. A further
policy behind the Court's refusal to dismiss the claim is the
Court's evident willingness' to give environmental litigants the
opportunity to more easily and securely raise environmental
claims. 3
The Court, however, chose not to base its holding on the
specific concerns of the case and instead, the case was made to
turn on a procedural point. The Court stated that although plaintiffs might have been required to make a stronger showing of
causality on a motion for summary judgment, they should not be
forced to show more on a motion to dismiss. 3 This holding represents a failure of the Court to take responsibility for articulating
the significant environmental considerations which undoubtedly
led the Court to search for some procedure safeguard on which to
ostensibly base their decision."
n Administrative Procedure Act, § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 720 (1970), which provides: "A
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof."
" Plaintiffs allege that the rate structure would selectively discourage the transportation and use of recyclable materials, consequently increase the consumption of natural
resources, and thereby result in the proliferation of refuse and litter. The railroad replied
that the surcharge represents a general rate increase and would not discourage the movement of scrap materials. 412 U.S. at 676.
" For a discussion advocating a liberal viewpoint regarding standing, see generally
The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. Rav. 450 (1970); Tucker, The Metamorphosis of the Standing to Sue Doctrine, 17 N.Y.L.F. 911, 929 (1972).
2 412 U.S. at 689.
11 For a discussion of relevant considerations underlying situations like SCRAP, see
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In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,3

the citizens-plaintiffs sought a declaration that members of Congress were ineligible to hold a commission in the Armed Forces
Reserve because of the incompatibility clause of the Constitution.32 The plaintiffs alleged that a violation of the incompatibility clause would deprive citizens of the faithful discharge of legislative duties by reservist members of Congress.3 The Court would
not grant standing because of the abstract and speculative nature
of the allegation.3 '
The weakness of the Court's decision is that a rule requiring
concrete injury is illogical and inappropriate when applied to a
constitutional provision which is designed to protect against injuries that are not necessarily concrete. The incompatibility clause
is aimed at eliminating the possible ill effects on the legislature
and the public from conflicts of interest in Congresspersons.
Thus, if the plaintiffs in Reservists are concerned that Congresspersons may fail to discharge their duties faithfully because
of conflict of interest, then the plaintiffs are suffering the very
injury the provision was designed to prevent. 35
One explanation for the Reservists decision was the Court's
concern for the implications of allowing citizens to involve legislators in suits grounded on abstract and speculative allegations,
which if sanctioned in courts, would impair a legislator's ability
to perform his duties on grounds which may amount to no more
than suspicion. In addition, the embarrassment associated with
generally Comment, Standing to Challenge Governmental Actions Which Have an Insubstantial or Attenuated Effect on the Environment, 1974 Dtrz L.J. 491.
31 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
32 "[N]o Person holding any office under the United States, shall be a Member of
either House during his Continuance in Office." U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
418 U.S. at 212.
Id. at 220.
The problem of determining what injuries will be deemed concrete is particularly
apparent when Schlesigner v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), is
compared with United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), where possible harm to aesthetic and environmental interests was considered a sufficient injury in fact. In Justice
Marshall's dissent in Reservists, he expressed concern about the different results reached
in these two cases, stating that it was reprehensible that the Court's priorities would allow
hearing a claim involving interference with aesthetic appreciation of natural resources,
but would not countenance one involving violation of a specific constitutional provision.
418 U.S. at 239-40. Implicit in this contrast is the fact that the Court recognizes a varying
hierarchy of values, the more important of which will provide a controlling consideration
in the decision regarding standing.

1978
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such litigation could be politically detrimental thus encouraging
nuisance suits. But by not giving express weight to these policy
considerations, the Court raised for subsequent courts formidable
questions about the degree of concreteness needed for standing
and created confusion as to the contextual appropriateness of the
concrete injury test.
In Warth v. Seldin,36 one group of plaintiffs consisted of low
and moderate income individuals who resided outside of the town
of Penfield. They claimed that Penfield's zoning ordinance had
prevented persons of low and moderate income from acquiring
residential property in the town. 7 In denying those plaintiffs
standing, the Court enunciated a new causation test. The plaintiffs must allege facts from which it could reasonably be inferred
that, absent Penfield's restrictive zoning practices, there would
be a substantial probability that they would have been able to
purchase or lease in Penfield.8 The plaintiffs were denied access
to federal court because they had not demonstrated that they
personally would benefit in a tangible way from federal court
intervention." The Court, while recognizing that plaintiffs suffered a loss of housing opportunity, decided that this injury was
not caused by Penfield's asserted illegal acts but rather was a
consequence of the economy of the area housing market. 0
The Warth Court used standing as a device to limit its policymaking role in the exclusionary zoning area rather than as a
device to measure the sufficiency of plaintiffs' injuries. Although
clothed as a constitutional decision that an insufficient causal
relationship existed between plaintiffs' exclusion and Penfield's
zoning ordinance to warrant effective relief," Warth is based on
a prudential determination to impose higher injury in fact standards where constitutional rights are being adjudicated. 2 By bas- 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
" The community's land use ordinance allocated 98% of the town's vacant land to
single-family dwellings. Only .3% of the land available for residential construction was
zoned for multifamily dwellings. Id. at 495.
" 422 U.S. at 504.
" Id. at 503-07.
Id. at 506.
" The Court's reliance on Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973),
illustrated
this concern. 422 U.S. at 504 & n.79.

11See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E.
§ 3531, at 18 (Supp. 1975).

JURISDICTION

COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
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ing its rationale on the issue of causality, the Court distorts the
complex standing problem presented in Warth and sheds no light
on the considerations it thought important.
C.

Conclusion

The Court's treatment of injury in fact without any particularization in light of either the policies properly implicated or the
context of the relevant precedent threatens that it will become a
catchall for an unarticulated discretion on the part of the Court.
Too often various considerations have been merged into one confused inquiry concerning standing. The Court, in Wulff, disguised
its reasoning by focusing on the economic nature of the injury
asserted and the professional relationship involved. By basing its
decision on these aspects, the Court neglected the important difference between the precedent and Wulff in that the physicians
alleged no direct personal injury under a criminal statute. By
ignoring this disparity, the Court effectuated its policy consideration of expanding the constitutional right of privacy concerning
governmental intrusions into matters relating to marriage, procreation, and family relationships by granting standing to physicians to contest statutes which prevent or severely restrict them
in the performing of abortions." In Wulff, the Court has actually
sought to emphasize that decisions arising out of the physicianpatient relationship are constitutionally protected under the right
of privacy, but in doing so, has failed to take responsibility for
articulating this as the paramount concern.
Underlying this tension is the Court's inability to fashion a
general rule substantially applicable within similar contexts. It is
necessary for the Court to place cases within meaningful groupings, to recognize within these groupings the considerations properly evoked in determining standing, and to articulate clearly
and consistently through a more descriptive analysis the controlling factors in future cases.
II.

STANDING TO ASSERT CONSTITUTIONAL Jus TERTII

The second basis upon which the Court granted standing to
the physicians in Wulff was as representatives of their patients.
43 A generalized right of privacy is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution. It is
entirely the creation of the judiciary. See discussion note 12 supra.

SINGLETON v. WULFF

Although the Court has proclaimed a general presumption
against the representative assertion of a person's right (jus tertii)," the Court looks primarily to two factual elements to determine whether this presumption should apply in a particular case.
The first is the ability of the third party to assert his own right."
The second" is the presence of a substantial relationship between
the litigant and the person whose rights he seeks to assert. 7
Applying these principles led the Court to grant jus tertii.48
The Court found several obstacles to the women's assertion of
their own rights. They could be chilled from asserting their rights
by a desire to protect the privacy of their decision. Also, the Court
stressed the imminent mootness of any individual woman's
claim." The closeness of the relationship was satisfied by the
confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship. Each of
these factors is considered below.
A. Analysis of the Leading Cases: Obstacles
The Court reneges on its committment to the first factual
element justifying an exception when, after admitting that the
mentioned obstacles are surmountable through the use of a pseudonym or assembled class action,s the Court concludes that if the
assertion of a woman's right is to be representative to that extent
" 428 U.S. at 114 (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953)). This rule was
first enunciated in Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943), where a physician was denied
standing to attack a state anti-contraceptive statute in a declaratory judgment action on
the grounds that it endangered the lives of three of his patients and consequently constituted a deprivation of life without due process of law. The Court held that his patients
were not parties to the proceeding and that there was no basis on which to secure an
adjudication of his patients' constitutional rights. Id. at 46. The primary consideration
was the fact that there was no bar to the patients asserting their own rights on their own
behalf.
, 428 U.S. at 116.
0 Id. at 115.
'1 Id. (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
116 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 481 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953)).
" 428 U.S. at 118.
" Id. at 117.
Suit may be brought under a pseudonym. Furthermore, the case should not be
treated as moot since the question is likely to recur and a holding of mootness would make
it difficult or impossible for an important constitutional question to ever be presented for
decision by the Court. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1973). The Court, in
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), suggests that a class could be assembled, whose
fluid membership always included some women with live claims. Id. at 117.
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anyway, then there seems little loss in terms of effective advocacy
from allowing its assertion by a physician.' This argument indicates that the Court is willing to allow jus tertii whenever per52
sonal litigation becomes practicably impossible.
An analysis of the precedent relied upon by the plurality
confirms the necessity of practicable impossibility. Wulff can be
distinguished from these cases because the factor of impossibility
is not present so as to justify the Court in granting an exception.
In Barrows v. Jackson,53 a covenantor who sold land to a
black purchaser in violation of a racially restrictive covenant was
granted jus tertii, when he was sued for damages by another party
to the covenant, to assert that enforcement of the convenant by
an award of damages would violate the equal protection rights of
prospective black purchasers of similarly restricted property. The
Court argued that it would be "difficult if not impossible" for the
prospective vendees to assert their grievance before any court.54
Other factors confirm the virtual impossibility of prospective
black vendees asserting their own constitutional rights. First, the
victim of the possible discrimination would not be known.5 5 Second, it is difficult to see how, in the absence of a contract to sell,
a black purchaser could have an actionable interest. And finally,
there would be no chance, even under broad intervention rules,
that a black would become a party to any proceeding to protest
that the awarding of damages to a covenantor would impair his
right to purchase property in the future."
In NAACP v. Alabama,5 7 the NAACP, in resisting efforts
to enjoin it from doing business in the State of Alabama, had
standing to assert that compulsory production of membership
" 428 U.S. at 117-18.
" Id. at 126.

346 U.S. 249 (1953).
" Id. at 257.
' The Court refers to them as "unidentified but identifiable," meaning persons who
might want to purchase a house but could not do so because of the racially restrictive
covenant. Id. at 254.
" The federal courts recognize two types of intervention: 1) Intervention by right
where conferred by federal statute and 2) intervention discretionary with the court where
the intervenor's claim or defense involves a question of law or fact common to the action.
FED. R. Crv. P. 24.
57 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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lists violated the constitutional rights of its members to freedom
of association. 58 The action of the state was claimed unconstitutional because it would have deprived the members of their right
to remain anonymous and to keep their membership in the organization secret. The members would have had to forgo those
rights in order to assert them. The only possible way that their
rights could have been effectively protected was to permit the
association to assert them."
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,10 an advocate of birth control who was
prosecuted for violating a statute forbidding the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons had standing to assert the
constitutional claims of persons to whom he had distributed contraceptives. The Court reasoned that since the statute prohibits,
not use, but distribution, persons denied access to contraceptives
are not themselves subject to prosecution and, to that extent, are
denied a forum in which to assert their own rights.2
Singleton v. Wulff13 can be distinguished from the Barrows
line of cases on the issue of jus tertii in that the third party
patients can easily seek relief on their own behalf."4 The Missouri
" Id. at 466.
" An effective way of counteracting pressures designed to nullify the constitutional

rights of others may be to permit a third person who is not subject to the same pressures
to assert them jus tertii.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
" MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. Ch. 272, §§ 21, 21A (West 1970).
Section 21 provides in part: "Except as provided in section twenty-one A, whoever
• . . gives away. . . any drug, medicine, instrument or article whatsoever for the prevention of conception . . . shall be punished by imprisonment. . . or by a fine ....
"
Section 21A provides in part: "A registered physician may administer to and prescribe for any married person drugs or articles intended for the prevention of pregnancy
or conception. A registered pharmacist . . . may furnish such drugs or articles to any
married person presenting a prescription from a registered physician."
" The Court found a comparatively stronger basis for granting jus tertii than in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where a physician who was criminally
charged as accessory to the crime of using birth control devices had standing to assert that
the Connecticut anti-birth control measure violated the constitutional rights of his patients to privacy in marital relations. The Court argued that unmarried persons denied
access to contraceptives in Massachusetts, unlike the users of contraceptives in Connecticut, are not themselves subject to prosecution and, consequently, under the statute are
denied a forum in which to assert their own rights. The Massachusetts statute, unlike
the Connecticut statute considered in Griswold, prohibits the distribution, not the use,
of contraceptives. 405 U.S. at 446.
63 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
See Note, Denial of Equal Protection to Patients as also Constituting Denial of
Equal Protection to Physicians, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 213, 221-22 (1975).
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Medicaid statute expressly provides the welfare recipients with a
statutory right to an administrative hearing if their claims for
medical assistance are denied." Furthermore, the welfare recipients are afforded the right to appeal decisions regarding requests
for medical assistance payments through the administrative process as required by federal legislation and established under the
Missouri Revised Code." By this direct statutory endowment,
absent in Barrows, NAACP, and Eisenstadt, the patients in
Wulff are granted the means to assert their rights on their own
behalf.
One of the difficulties in applying the obstacle test is a lack
of Court guidance in determining what relative degree of impracticability is conclusive to warrant the assertion of a third party's
rights. As it stands, the test does not serve its intended purpose
of providing a reasonably useful criterion for factually determining standing, but rather lends itself to whatever measure of adaptation serves the Court's discretion in granting or in refusing jus
tertii on prudential grounds. This test, like the causation test, is
another example of how the Court obscures what is at issue in a
given case by creating an analytic device that can be stretched
to accommodate the unarticulated discretion of the Court. The
Court can fashion this test, as it did in Wulff, to grant or to refuse
standing without either an enunciation of the policies properly
implicated or a close regard for the context of relevant precedent.
B. Analysis of the Leading Cases: Physician - Patient
Relationship
Focusing on the professional relationships in Barrows, Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Doe, the Court indicated that allowing
physicians in Wulff standing to assert their patients' rights flows
naturally from these decisions. 7 To the extent that there is a preexisting and substantial relationship' 8 rather than a fortuitous
6 Mo. REV. STAT. § 208.156 (Supp. 1975) ("The department of public health and
welfare shall provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing to any applicant or
recipient whose claim for medical assistance is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable
promptness." Id.).
" 38 Fed. Reg. 22007, § 205.10(a)(5) (1973) ("An opportunity for a hearing shall be
granted to any applicant who requests a hearing because his claim for financial or medical
assistance is denied . . . and to any recipient who is aggrieved by any agency action
resulting in suspension, reduction, discontinuance, or termination of assistance." Id.).
6? 428 U.S. at 115.
I at 117.
Id.
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one, the Court seems willing to grant jus tertii 9 An analysis of
these cases demonstrates that the Wulff Court has not clearly
recognized that a relationship has no abstract importance but
rather assumes significance by establishing a link between the
claimant's injury and the constitutional right of the third party.
In Barrows v. Jackson,70 the issue was whether the right of
prospective black purchasers of real estate to be free from racial
covenants implied or necessitated derivative protection for white
sellers to be free from damages for breach of the covenant by
selling to blacks. The vendor-vendee relationship was protected
because the policy against discrimination implied collateral protection for white sellers.7'
In the birth control controversies of Griswold v. Connecticut 2
and Eisenstadt v. Baird,73 suppliers of contraceptive materials
69We should expect that the Court's sensitivity to the importance of a particular kind
of relationship would vary from time to time as a general reflection of the existing social
values. Today, for example, the Court is more apt to recognize the significance of a
professional or fiduciary relationship as opposed to a commercial relationship and find
that for certain social policy reasons one is more deserving of the Court's protection than
the other. This change in emphasis illustrates how judicial doctrine develops in response
to the particular problems and attitudes of a given social period and confirms the Court's
social function as an arbiter and maker of policy. This course of development is both
reasonable and desirable when you consider that the security of commercial transactions
is embodied in established contract law doctrine while various protections of personal
liberties have only recently come to be explained as resting on a constitutional right of
privacy. It is not surprising, then, that the Court has taken a more active role to safeguard
matters relating to marriage, procreation, and family relationships since the protection
of these recently conceived liberties is not yet embodied in any established legal doctrine.
See also discussion in note 82 infra.
As one example of increased judicial sensitivity, notice that the effect of holding a
statute to be overbroad is to relax the usual standing rule that a litigant challenging a
statute must show that his or her own conduct was constitutionally protected. In the
preferred first amendment area, a litigant may attack a statute's constitutionality on
overbreadth grounds even though the litigant may have engaged in conduct that the state
could constitutionally have regulated by a statute that was more narrowly drawn. The
primary reason for this extended base of standing is that the Court has been concerned
about potential self-censorship by other persons who might be afraid to engage in protected speech because of the statute's broad coverage. If such persons did not speak, then
the statute would have an inhibiting effect on constitutionally protected speech. See e.g.,
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1972).
70 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
" The Court implicitly recognized this reasoning when it granted the vendor jus tertii
to challenge restrictive covenants because the owner "is the one in whose charge and
keeping reposed the power to continue to use the property to discriminate or to discontinue
such use." Id. at 259.
" 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
73

405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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were prosecuted under statutes forbidding use in Connecticut and
distribution in Massachusetts, respectively. By granting jus tertii
to the physicians in each case, the Court implicitly recognized the
dependent nature of the relationship between enjoyment of a constitutional protection and the guarantee of access. The Court
reasoned that the rights of recipients were likely to be diluted or
adversely affected if they could not be asserted by the physi4
cians.1

In Roe v. Wade75 and Doe v. Bolton,7" a patient's right to
privacy was held to confer upon her physician a resultant right
to perform abortions during her protected period. Physicians have
a protected interest in performing abortions by virtue of the policy toward women. The Court argued in Roe" that a woman's
exercise of her right to an abortion is necessarily at stake since
she cannot safely secure an abortion without the aid of a physician.
In Singleton v. Wulff,7" the Court emphasized that the presence of the confidential physician-patient relationship merged
the physician and his patient for constitutional standing purposes.7" By stressing the importance of a particular type of relationship that would justify an exception to the general rule, the
Court offered a principle which is subordinate in importance to
the nature of the governmental impact upon that relationship. 0
This analysis indicates that what is important is not whether a
parciular category of relationship exists but rather whether the
Missouri statute substantially impairs the expectancies or characteristics naturally arising out of the physician-patient relationship.
By placing primary emphasis on the nature of the relationship, the plurality seems to be generating a category of relationships, anyone of which, in itself, would justify a grant of jus tertii.
The problem with this reasoning is that it promises to provide a
11381

U.S. at 481; 405 U.S. at 445-46.
75410 U.S. 113 (1973).
76 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-56 (1973).
7
428 U.S. 106 (1976).
7'

Id. at 117.

" The dissent would keep the emphasis on the impact of the litigation on the third
party interests and treat the closeness of any relationship as only one factor in determining
whether the third party interests will be represented adequately. Id. at 128 n.5.

SINGLETON v. WULFF

1978

reasonably useful criterion for factually determining jus tertii,
but in actuality only surfaces one factor that a court should consider in deciding standing. Besides the presence of a substantial
relationship, equally important factors are the nature of the governmental impact upon that relationship and the degree to which
the third party is dependent on the claimant for the protection
of his right. Although the Court recognized these contextual factors,"' by analyzing Wulff in terms of a general rule with principled exceptions, the Court obscured the importance of these factors and failed to articulate the rationale behind the significance
given to a professional relationship.
C.

Conclusion

Although the Court has exercised its discretion to proclaim
a general presumption against standing to assert the constitutional claims of third parties, the Court has recognized many
departures from this rule. The frequency with which the Court
has allowed exceptions suggests the lack of any coherent justification for the Court's general rule. This uncertainty can be attributed to the Court's failure to articulate the policy considerations
properly implicated by its decisions and to recognize that these
concerns cannot be itemized according to any principled criteria
but rather are more accurately based on a variety of factors implicit in the various contexts in which jus tertii arises. By attempting to structure its reasoning with reference to two conclusive factors, the Court obscures the process by which the scope
of jus tertii is determined.
Although it is generally wise to limit the assertion of jus
tertii, there are instances where, in order to perpetuate other
significant values, there must be a relaxation of the standing
requirement. In such instances, it is imperative that the Court
develop and apply well defined considerations so that neither set
of values is diminished. 2 At the present time, the Court is more
" The Court reasons that the woman's exercise of her right to an abortion is necessarily at stake in Singleton v. Wulff, 410 U.S. 106 (1976), because "an impecunious woman
cannot easily secure an abortion without the physician's being paid by the State." Id. at
117. In addition, "[T]he constitutionally protected abortion decision is one in which the
physician is intimately involved." Id.
" For example, to the extent that the Court is willing to give special protection to a
particular right or value, it may be willing to take a broadened view of standing when that
right is asserted, although it is the right of one other than the claimant. The Court may
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concerned with advancing and protecting personal liberties such
as freedom from racial discrimination, s freedom of association,
and the right of privacy with respect to governmental intrusions
into matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, and
abortion." This emphasis results because certain constitutional
guarantees, within a given social period, inspire a greater sensitivity on the part of the Court than do others.8 6 Wulff is an example of the Court's grappling with the task of clarifying and defining recently conceived personal liberties in matters of privacy
through a broadened bases of standing to assert jus tertii.
Daniel W, Moynihan
be eager to clarify the law in a particular area in order to prevent the inibition of the values
embodied in that right because of the uncertainties as to its exact scope. Singleton v.
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) is one example of this broadened base of standing being
extended to a litigant in order to insure the protection of a third party's interest, which is
implicated by their relationship.
0 See, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
M See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
" See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Nyberg v. City of Va., 495 F.2d
1342 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 891 (1974); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
" See discussion in note 69 supra.

